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CONTRACTS 
Professor Kathleen E. Payne 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the survey period, only three cases were decided 
involving significant contract issues. The first case involves an 
application of Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207(1), 
providing for an acceptance which is "expressly conditional" 
on assent. What language constitutes such an acceptance, a:Qd 
is therefore a counter-offer, remains a continuing problem for 
practitioners and courts alike. The second case also involves 
a sale of goods and application of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. In that case course of performance was examined to 
determine whether the seller breached the "implied warranty 
of merchantability." The final case involves common law con-
tract principles and the question of whether the City of Detroit's 
failure to make timely payments constituted a "material breach" 
of a construction contract. 
I. COUNTER-OFFERS UNDER U .C.C. SECTION 2-207 
In Ralph Shrader, Inc., v. Diamond International Corp., 1 
an aerosol can buyer (Shrader) brought suit against the seller, 
American Can Company (American), and two other suppliers 
for damages arising out of a breach of contract. The claims 
against the other two suppliers (Diamond International and 
Crown Cork & Seal) were settled, thus leaving American as 
the sole defendant. 2 
Shrader is the developer-manufacturer of petroleum-based 
automotive products, particularly carburetor cleaner. The prod-
ucts are marketed under various names and packaged iIi aerosol 
cans. 
Prior to 1978, all of the cans produced by American, as 
well as other can manufacturers, were sealed by a soldered 
l. 833 F.2d 1210 (6th CiT. 1987). 
2. [d. at 1212. 
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seam. Shrader filled the can with its product, sealed a cap 
onto the can, then added Freon-12, a propellant, to pressurize 
the can. However, in the fall of 1977, American and the other 
can manufacturers switched from soldered seams to welded 
seams on the cans. Shrader switched to the welded seam cans 
as the soldered seam cans became unavailable. 
By December of 1978, the use of Freon-12 as a propellant 
in pressurized products was banned by the federal government. 
As a result, the company began testing nitrous oxide but in 
the older, soldered seamed cans. Sometime in 1978, Shrader 
then began testing the nitrous oxide in the welded seam cans. 
The company soon determined that these cans could burst due 
to increased pressure, the result of a chemical reaction with 
the welded seam. Shrader thus initiated a recall campaign of 
these cans in 1980.3 
Shrader initiated action against two of its suppliers in 1981, 
joining American as a defendant in September of 1983. Shrader 
sought two million dollars in damages from American and 
alleged three causes of action: breach of implied warranty; 
negligence; and failure to properly design, manufacture, and 
test the cans. 4 
American motioned for summary judgment, relying on a 
provision on the back of its acknowledgement form which 
reduced the period of limitations from four years to two years.s 
American claimed that Shrader's claims were time-barred as 
the buyer knew of the problems with the cans since 1979. 
Finally, American relied on another provision on the back of 
its acknowledgement form which excluded claims for conse-
quential damages. 6 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.c.) a 
four year statute of limitations period is adopted for contracts involving the sale 
of goods. The U.C.C. further provides that the parties may reduce the period of 
limitation, to a period of time not less than one year. The instant case was brought 
in the district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, thus Michigan law 
controls. Accordingly, the Michigan version of the U.C.C. applies. See MICH. COMPo 
LAWS § 440.2725(1) (West 1967). 
6. 833 F.2d at 1212. The Sixth Circuit opinion refers to a clause in American's 
acknowledgement form which excludes recovery of consequential damages and then 
quotes the following language from the acknowledgement form: "[I]f supplier is 
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In response, Shrader argued that the provisions in American's 
acknowledgement form were not part of the contract because 
the acknowledgement form was a "conditional acceptance" or 
counter-offer under Section 440.2207(1) of the Michigan Stat-
ute, requiring assent. 7 Alternatively, Shrader argued that Amer-
ican's acknowledgement form was an acceptance of Shrader's 
offer to purchase. However, the stated terms materially altered 
Shrader's offer and thus are not part of the contract under 
Section 440.2207(2) of the Michigan Statute.8 
The federal district court granted American's motion for 
summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that the ac-
knowledgement form was an acceptance.9 Additionally, the 
liable to buyer for breach of ... warranty and any actionable negligence of supplier, 
[such] liability on any claim, whether in tort or in contract, shall not exceed the 
cost to buyer of the faulty goods and any materials packed therein." Technically, 
this term is a limitation of remedy provision which impliedly excludes recovery of 
consequential damages. Section 2-719 provides that the parties may agree to limit 
the remedies available in the event of breach. See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 440.2719. 
7. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 440.2207(1) (West 1967). Section 2-207, drafted as 
the codes's solution to the "battle of the forms," is one of the most written about, 
litigated sections of the V.C.C. The section provides: 
"(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an ac-
ceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional 
on assent to the additional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to 
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alters it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract 
is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the 
parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such cases the terms of 
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of 
the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated 
under any other provisions of this Act." Id. 
8. Id. 
9. 833 F.2d at 1212. The district court relied on the first clause of § 2-207(1) 
and determined that the acknowledgement was a definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance even though it contained terms additional to or different from those 
of the offer. In reaching this result, the district court must have rejected the 
argument that the acknowledgement was made expressly conditional on assent to 
the additional or different terms. See V.C.C. § 2-207(1), supra note 8. 
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district court found that both Shrader and American were 
merchants, and that since the terms in the acknowledgement 
form did not materially alter the offer, the terms automatically 
became a part of the contract. IO 
The question on appeal to the Sixth Circuit is whether the 
reduced statute of limitations period and the limited remedy 
provision contained on the reverse side of the acknowledgement 
form are a part of the contract between American and Shrader. 
If the terms are a part of the agreement, then the trial court 
correctly granted summary judgment for American. 
In order to resolve this question, the Sixth Circuit had to 
evaluate the language of the acknowledgement form and de-
termine whether it was an effective acceptance or whether it 
was a conditional acceptance which would only be effective 
as an acceptance if the offeror assented to the additional 
terms.11 Whether a sale of goods acceptance should be treated 
as a traditional common law counter-offer depends on the 
specific language of the acceptance. The language at issue in 
American's acknowledgement form is found in the following 
clause: 
The terms set forth on the reverse side are the only ones upon 
which we will accept orders. These terms supersede all prior written 
understandings, assurances and offers. Your attention is especially 
directed to the provisions concerning warranty and liability of 
supplier and claim procedure. In any event, these terms shall become 
binding on both parties upon your acceptance of our first delivery 
of any goods specified herein, or upon commencement of manu-
facturing operations. Advise us immediately if anything in the 
acknowledgement is incorrect or otherwise unacceptable. 12 
10. 833 F.2d at 1212. See also U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b). Between merchants 
additional terms automatically become a part of the contract unless the offer 
expressly limits acceptance to its terms, the terms materially alter the contract, or 
notification of objection to the terms has been given or is given within a reasonable 
time. Where one or both of the parties are non-merchants, the additional terms 
are merely proposals which must be agreed to by the offeror. 
11. If the acknowledgement form contains a definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance it will be treated as an acceptance. If, however, the acknowledgement 
conditions the seller's acceptance of the buyer's offer on buyer's assent to the 
additional terms, the acknowledgement form is a counter-offer. Professors White 
and Summers refer to these methods of contract formation as "Routes A & B." 
For their lively, informative discussion see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 39 (1988). 
12. 833 F.2d at 1213. 
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Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit was faced with deciding whether 
the quoted language clearly states a counter-offer. Courts gen-
erally strictly construe such language. 
Section 2-207 was drafted to solve the battle of the forms 
problem, at least in part, by adopting an "anti-last shot" 
policy.13 If sellers could control the terms of a sale of goods 
contract by making the so-called acceptance expressly condi-
tional and thus a counter-offer, one of the main purposes of 
the Code section would be undermined. To avoid this result, 
courts generally strictly construe the expressly conditional pro-
viso of § 2-207(1). 
One of the significant cases that established this standard is 
the Sixth Circuit case of Dorton v. Collins & Aikman CorpY 
In analyzing the language of the defendant carpet seller's 
acknowledgement form, the Dorton court stated: 
In order to fall within the [Subsection 2-207(1)] proviso, it is not 
enough that an acceptance is expressly conditional on additional 
or different terms; rather, an acceptance must be expressly con-
ditional on the offeror's assent to those terms. Viewing the Sub-
section (1) proviso within the context of the rest of that Subsection 
and within the policies of Section 2-207 itself, we believe that it 
was intended to apply only to an acceptance which clearly reveals 
that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless 
he is assured of the offeror's assent to the additional or different 
terms therein .... That the acceptance is predicated on the offeror's 
assent must be "directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather 
than implied or left to inference."13 
In the present case, the Sixth Circuit referred to the Dorton 
standard, and then concluded that the instant case fell within 
the narrow exception and that the acceptance of American was 
13. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11. 
14. 453 F.2d 1161 (6th CiT. 1972). 
15. 453 F.2d at 1168. In Dorton, the "Customer Acknowledgement" form 
provided: "This order is given subject to all of the terms and conditions on the 
face and reverse side hereof, including the provisions for arbitration and the 
exclusions of warranties, all of which are accepted by Buyer, supersede Buyer's 
order form, if any and constitute the entire contract between Buyer and Seller." 
Id. at 1164. In evaluating this language the Sixth Circuit held that although the 
words "subject to" suggest that the acceptances were conditional, the acceptances 
were not made expressly conditional on the Buyer's assent to the additional terms 
as required by the Subsection 2-207(1) proviso. [d. at 1168. 
HeinOnline -- 1989 Det. C.L. Rev. 604 1989
604 Detroit College of Law Review [2:599 
conditional. The court further noted that the language, taken 
as a whole, clearly indicated that American would accept only 
its own terms. 16 
Having found that the acceptance of American was expressly 
conditional, the Sixth Circuit then addressed the question of 
whether Shrader had "assented" to the additional terms. The 
court noted that assent, for purposes of Section 2-207(1), was 
not clearly defined by Michigan law. Where acceptance is 
conditional, as in the case at bar, the Sixth Circuit held that 
assent is a question for the trier of fact. Accordingly, the court 
found that summary judgment was not appropriate and the 
case was reversed and remanded Y 
Application of Section 2-207 is difficult; even the hornbook 
authors disagree on several points. IS With respect to the instant 
matter, this author finds the facts indistinguishable from the 
Dorton l9 case. Although the Sixth Circuit found that the seller 
was "unwilling to proceed unless assured of the offeror's assent 
to the additional or different terms,' '20 no language to that 
effect can be found in the acknowledgement form. The court 
is correct in holding that American's form attempted to create 
a contract only on its own terms. However, that is not the 
standard for determining whether the acknowledgement should 
be treated as a counter-offer. "[Ilt is not enough that an 
acceptance is expressly conditional on additional or different 
terms; rather, an acceptance must be expressly conditional on 
the offeror's assent to those terms. "21 Applied to the instant 
acknowledgement form it was a binding acceptance and the 
parties were contractually bound. 
16. 833 F.2d at 1214-15. 
17. Id. at 1215. 
18. For example, Professors White and Summers are not in accord with respect 
to the treatment of different terms under § 2-207(2). WHITE & SUMMERS, supra 
note 11, at 33-35. Furthermore, the hornbook authors disagree as to whether a 
buyer who receives and accepts good shipped by the seller has expressly assented 
to the terms of a conditional acceptance. Most courts are unwilling to find that 
such conduct constitutes assent to the terms. Id. at 40. 
19. 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972). 
20. 833 F.2d at 1214 (quoting Challenge Machinery Co. v. Mattison Machine 
Works, 138 Mich. App. 15, 359 N.W.2d 232 (1984) (per curiam». 
21. This is the standard enunciated in the Dorton case. 453 F.2d at 1168 
(emphasis in original). 
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However, before determining whether the district court's 
grant of summary judgment was appropriate, it is necessary 
to ascertain whether the terms in the acknowledgment form 
materially alter the offer. The terms in question are a reduced 
statute of limitations period and a limitation of remedy pro-
vision. The Code does not delineate those terms which ma-
terially alter a contract. However, the Code Comments do give 
examples. 
Comment number five lists examples of clauses which involve 
no element of unreasonable surprise and therefore are to be 
incorporated into the contract unless notice of objection is 
given. None of the examples given speak specifically to nar-
rowed statute of limitations, however, one example does cover 
"a clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints within cus-
tomary limits." A clause "limiting [a] remedy in a reasonable 
manner" is listed as an example of a clause which would not 
materially alter the contract. 22 Based upon the Code Comments, 
it would appear that the acknowledgement terms in question 
do not materially alter the contract. 
Nevertheless, not all commentators and courts agree with 
the Code Comments, at least with respect to a term which 
limits a remedy in a reasonable manner. 23 Since a limitation 
of remedies provision could result in hardship, a determination 
of whether a given term constitutes a material alteration may 
present a question of fact which can not be dealt with sum-
marily. 
II. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY 
This case was decided exclusively on its facts and, thus, is 
not illustrative of Code interpretation. Nevertheless, it is pre-
sented here to illustrate the necessity of taking prompt action 
if goods are unsuitable and the buyer believes that the seller 
has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. 
In Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc. ,24 the seller-
manufacturer of glassware (Lancaster) brought an action against 
22. See Code Comments, v.c.c. § 2-207. 
23. See the discussion and cases found in Murray, The Chaos of the Battle 
of the Forms: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1362-63 (1986). 
24. 835 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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the buyer of electronic bulbs (Philips) to recover the contract 
price for bulbs which the buyer25 had contracted to purchase 
but refused to accept. The buyer defended on the ground that 
the tendered bulbs were defective and counterclaimed to recover 
for allegedly defective bulbs which had already been paid for. 
Prior to 1980, Lancaster manufactured and sold an electronic 
glass bulb known as the LEA-1015B. In essence, this bulb was 
an empty television tube made entirely of glass. When Philips 
began purchasing the LEA-1015B bulbs, it requested a copy 
of Lancaster's engineering drawing, which was last revised in 
1973. Philips purchased more than a half-million bulbs from 
Lancaster between 1974-1979. Philips also purchased twelve-
inch bulbs from other suppliers during the same time period. 
Philips then converted the bulbs into cathode ray tubes for 
eventual use as computer screens and similar video display 
monitors. 
After Philips received an order from one of its customers, 
it would treat the tube with "implosion protection. "26 Implosion 
systems prevent glass in the tubes from flying outward and 
causing injury in the event the tubes are shattered. Philips 
used two systems of implosion protection: the traditional method 
of "shellbonding," whereby a seal was placed over the face 
of the tube; and the more recently developed method of "T-
bonding," whereby a steel strip is placed around the perimeter 
of the bulb, then tightened. 
T -banding eventually replaced shellbonding because it was 
less expensive and because T -banded tubes could fit into a 
smaller cabinet. There were certain disadvantages with this 
process, however; if the T-band moved or slipped after it was 
tightened the implosion protection was compromised and the 
25. The original contract for the electronic bulbs was between Lancaster and 
GTE Products Corp. The GTE division responsible for the issues in this lawsuit 
was sold to Philips on January 21, 1981. Both Philips and GTE were named a 
defendants. Hereinafter, both defendants are .. designated as "Philips." 835 F.2d at 
653 n.1. 
26. Because the sealed tubes are under a vacuum the glass is subject to excessive 
atmospheric pressure. A hole made in the face of the tube would cause the glass 
around the tube to implode from the pressure. Implosion protection systems were 
utilized by Philips to minimize the risk of violent implosions and to meet industry 
safety requirements. 835 F.2d at 654. 
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tube no longer fit into the customer's cabinet or chassis. 27 The 
shift from shellbonding to T -banding was not unique to Philips 
and Lancaster was aware of the trend.28 
The events relevant to this case occurred over a sixteen 
month period. In January of 1980, Philips ordered 20,000 
LEA-1015B bulbs which were released throughout the month. 
The agreed upon price was $8.90 per bulb. Subsequently, 
officials from both companies met to discuss prices and an-
ticipated bulb needs. At that time, Philips' sales forecasts were 
very favorable whereas Lancaster predicted a substantial cost 
increase. Lancaster suggested that it would be mutually ad-
vantageous for Philips to place a large order at that time so 
that Lancaster could purchase materials immediately at the 
lowest possible price. Lancaster offered to sell the LEA-1015B 
bulbs for $8.25 each if Philips agreed to increase its order to 
100,000 bulbs. Philips accepted the offer on February 14, 1980, 
and placed an order for 101,029 bulbs. 
Philips then prepared one of its standard purchase o):"ders 
and sent it to Lancaster. Lancaster returned the signed purchase 
order to Philips. The purchase order contained several pro-
visions which are relevant to this dispute, including sections 
entitled "WARRANTIES" and "CANCELLATION AND 
REMEDIES." The purchase order also provided that shipment 
of the order was to be "as released. "29 It was understood by 
Lancaster that this language meant the order would be com-
pleted in 1980.30 
Lancaster began releasing bulbs in March of 1980. In April 
of 1980, Philips was first notified by one of its customers that 
the T -bands on a shipment of twelve-inch bulbs had slipped. 
Upon examination, it was determined that all of the bulbs 
with slipped bands were Lancaster's LEA-1015B bulbs. Nev-
ertheless, Philips continued to request new releases until the 
end of June. 
Despite Philips' efforts, the problem of T-band slippage 
continued. Philips' engineers suspected that the slippage prob-
27. 835 F.2d at 654. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 655. 
30. Id. at 654-55. 
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lem was related to the size of the angles at each of the four 
diagonal corners of the bulb faceplate. The bulbs were sent 
to Owens-Illinois for measurement during the summer of 1980 
and Philip's suspicions proved correct. Lancaster's engineering 
drawing showed the diagonal angles to be one-and-one-half 
degrees with no tolerance indicated.31 Upon examination, how-
ever, Philips learned that some of the angles exceeded one-
and-one-half degrees. It was at this same time that the market 
for twelve-inch tubes declined. 
Philips first advised Lancaster of the problem on August 1, 
1980. At a meeting of the two companies on August 18, Philips' 
requested Lancaster's help in finding a solution to the T-band 
slippage. Philips' engineers suggested that the T-band system 
might work better if the diagonal angles were straighter. After 
reviewing the available data, Lancaster agreed that Philip's 
suggestion would probably work but noted the modification 
would require a change in the mold used to make the bulbsY 
Lancaster agreed to modify the molds but only after Philip's 
had depleted the existing inventory for the February 1980 order. 
Philips made no objections to this arrangement at that time. 33 
By September of 1980, more than 84,000 bulbs had yet to 
be released pursuant to the February agreement. Lancaster sent 
a 1981 price list to Philips indicating the price of the LEA-
1015B bulbs would increase from $8.25 to $9.40 effective 
December 31, 1980. In response, Philips advised Lancaster by 
phone that the market for twelve-inch bulbs had dropped and 
that Lancaster's competitors were "holding the line" on bulb 
prices throughout 1981. Philips repeated its request for price 
considerations in letters dated November 7, 1980 and December 
2, 1980. Philips never mentioned the T-banding problem during 
this time, and Lancaster continued to deny the requests for 
considerations. 
31. Plus and/or minus symbols which follow each dimension indicate that 
there is a specific range within which the bulb may vary from the drawing yet 
still be considered in conformance. [d. at 655. 
32. [d. at 655-56. 
33. Perhaps if Philips had given notice of breach of warranty at this time the 
court would have viewed the facts differently. The facts seem to show that the 
slipping of the T-bands was not Philips' major concern, rather, Philips was concerned 
with a declining market for sales and an increased price for bulbs. 
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The T -band problem was not mentioned again until the 
parties met in January of 1981 to negotiate the outstanding 
order. The official who conducted negotiations on behalf of 
Philips later testified that he brought up the T -banding problem 
"as a negotiating ploy" in an attempt to secure price con-
cessions from Lancaster. 34 
The parties continued to negotiate until they finally reached 
an agreement on January 29, 1981. Throughout February of 
1981, Philips continued to accept bulbs and pay for them 
pursuant to the January 29th agreement. In March, however, 
Philips again sought release from its contractual obligation. 
Meetings between the parties continued. At no time throughout 
these discussions, however, did Philips mention the T -banding 
problem, nor did Philips request credit for bulbs with slipped 
T-bands.3s 
During April of 1981, Philips conducted tests on a sample 
of twenty-five bulbs. The results showed that twenty-four of 
these bulbs had diagonal angles in excess of the one-and-one-
half degrees indicated on the engineering drawing. On April 
24, 1981, Philips advised Lancaster that it would accept no 
further deliveries until a meeting was held. At a meeting held 
on May 31, Philips claimed that the T -band slippage was caused 
by excessive angles and this problem prevented Philips from 
using the bulbs. Philips requested credit for the bulbs in its 
inventory and further stated it would not accept delivery of 
LEA-I015B bulbs remaining under the contract of February, 
1980.36 
The ensuing litigation involved several claims and counter-
claims. Lancaster sued Philips to recover the purchase price 
of 13,923 bulbs which Philips had received but not paid for, 
and also sued to recover the purchase price of 36,113 bulbs 
which Philips refused to accept under the contract. Philips 
counterclaimed to recover the price which it had paid for the 
21,483 bulbs still in its inventory. 
The district court rendered judgment in favor of Lancaster, 
holding that the non-toler anced diagonal angles did not render 
34. [d. at 656. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 657. 
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the bulbs defective and that the tendered bulbs therefore con-
formed to the contract. Alternatively, the district court held 
that the alleged non-conformities did not substantially impair 
the value of the contract to Philips.37 The court also held that 
Philips' claim that Lancaster breached the implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose failed because Philips was 
unable to prove that it relied on Lancaster's judgment to furnish 
suitable goods.38 Likewise, Lancaster did not breach implied 
and express warranties of merchantability because the bulbs 
were of an acceptable quality in the trade.39 
Philips raised three arguments on appeal: first, Philips con-
tested the district court's conclusion that the tendered bulbs 
conformed to the contract; second, Philips rejected the lower 
court's alternative holding that the alleged non-conformity failed 
to substantially impair the value of the contract; and third, 
Philips argued that the district court had applied the wrong 
standard in concluding that Lancaster did not breach implied 
and express warranties of merchantability. Philips maintained 
that the proper standard was that the bulbs must be suitable 
and sufficient for their ordinary and intended purpose.4O 
37. Vnder most contracts for the sale of goods, a buyer may reject the goods 
if they fail in any respect to conform to the contract. See V.C.C. § 2-601. Vnder 
this "perfect tender rule" Philips would be permitted to reject if notification of 
rejection were given timely. However, the instant contract was an installment 
contract: one which authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots for separate 
acceptance. See V.C.C. § 2-612(1). In an installment contract, the buyer may only 
reject the goods if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the in-
stallment and cannot be cured. See V.C.C. § 2-612(2). Substantial impairment is 
also the standard for revocation of acceptance. See V.C.C. § 2-608. In light of 
Philips continued use of the bulbs, substantial impairment would be difficult to 
prove. 
38. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is provided in 
V.C.C. § 2-315, which requires that "seller at the time of contracting has reason 
to know [of the] particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the 
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods." 
[d. Philips did not appeal the district court's conclusion that the cause- of action 
for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose failed. 835 
F.2d at 660. 
39. 835 F.2d at 657. Philips argues on appeal that this is an inappropriate 
standard for judging merchantability. V.C.C. § 2- 314(2) proposes several standards 
for merchantability, one which provides that: "[g]oods to be merchantable must 
be at least such as pass without objection in the trade under the contract description." 
40. 835 F.2d at 657-58. 
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The district court had noted that the terms of the contract 
between Lancaster and Philips were those contained in Philips' 
purchase order. In that contract, Lancaster promised that the 
LEA-1015B bulbs would "conform to all specifications, draw-
ings, [and) descriptions furnished, specified or adopted" by 
Philips.41 Because Philips had used Lancaster's engineering 
drawing, it was part of the contract. Therefore, Philips had 
the right to cancel the February, 1980 order if the tendered 
bulbs did not conform to the drawing. 
Although the Sixth Circuit agreed with the conclusion of 
the district court, it differed in its analysis. Since "course of 
performance" to explain the agreement had not been excluded 
by the purchase order, the court chose to begin at that point. 
When "the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for 
performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of 
the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the 
other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in 
without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning 
of the agreement.' '42 The Sixth Circuit was satisfied that, in 
. the present case, the prerequisites of V.C.C. Section 2-208(1) 
were met. 
Philips knew that some of the diagonal angles exceeded the 
one-and-one-half degrees called for in the drawing as early as 
April of 1980. In spite of this, Philips continued to accept 
releases of bulbs without objection. When Philips first discussed 
the T-band problem with Lancaster in August of 1980, Philips 
again failed to object to Lancaster's response that it would 
make changes only after the February, 1980 order was com-
pleted. 
Further, the slipping T -band issue was raised at the January, 
1981 meeting merely as a "negotiating ploy" in an attempt 
to obtain price concessions during a time when sales were slow. 
The court cited other such instances to support its finding that 
Philips had acquiesced without objection to Lancaster's ten-
dering of bulbs.43 The appeals court concluded that the bulbs 
41. [d. at 658. 
42. 835 F.2d at 659 (quoting v.c.c. § 2-208(1». 
43. From these facts a court might conclude that Lancaster had a defense to 
an action for breach of warranty, namely, that Philips failed to give timely notice 
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conformed to the contract, and that such a finding eliminated 
the necessity of addressing Philips' second argument. 44 
Philips' third argument on appeal, was that the district court 
used the wrong legal standard and, thus, incorrectly concluded 
that Lancaster had not breached express warranties and the 
implied warranty of merchantability.45 Philips argued that the 
bulbs must be suitable for their ordinary and intended purposes 
in order to be merchantable.46 Philips argued that the pro-
duction of T -banded tubes was an ordinary purpose for which 
the bulbs were used. Because the bulbs were not adequate for 
that ordinary purpose, Lancaster breached the implied warranty 
of merchantability. 
Philips also relied on a clause in the warranties section of 
the purchase order which obligated Lancaster to tender bulbs 
which were "merchantable and suitable and sufficient for their 
intended purposes. "47 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
contract's express warranty provided the same level of pro-
tection as that provided by the V.C.C.'s implied warranty of 
merchantability, thus treating express and implied warranties 
together. 48 
The court addressed the question of what standard was 
required to satisfy the requirement of merchantability under 
v.c.c. § 2-314, and noted that the standard of merchantability 
of the breach. Under U .C.C. § 2-607(3)(a): Where a tender has been accepted the 
buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered 
any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. "Any remedy" 
includes ancillary rights such as the right to revoke acceptance, as well as the right 
to damages. See WmTE & SUMMERS, supra note II, at 480. 
44. 835 F.2d at 659-60. See the discussion of Philip's second argument, supra 
at note 40. 
45. 835 F.2d at 660. See the discussion of "an acceptable quality in the trade" 
as a standard of merchantability, supra note 39. 
46. One of the standards by which merchantability may be judged is that 
"goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... are fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). 
47. 835 F .2d at 660. 
48. In examining the language of the purchase order, the Sixth Circuit noted 
that the phrase "intended purposes might arguably be interpreted as providing a 
greater level of protection than that provided by the U.C.C.'s implied warranty 
of merchantability. However, Philips, the drafter of the contract, had characterized 
this as an "express warranty of merchantability" throughout the entire appeal, 
thereby negating a requirement of greater protection. 
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is not readily defined.49 The Sixth Circuit found that the 
"acceptable quality in the trade" standard used by the lower 
court was satisfactory. so The Code Comment to Section 2-314 
lends support to the court's conclusion by stating: "Goods 
delivered under an agreement made by a merchant in a given 
line of trade must be of a quality comparable to that generally 
acceptable in that line of trade under the description or other 
designation of the goods used in the agreement. "51 
The court went on to examine the underlying purpose of 
Section 2-314 to support its conclusion. In every sale the parties 
face the risk that the goods will be made just as well as the 
seller intended, but they will prove to be unsuitable for the 
buyer's useY Further, "'merchantable' is not a synonym for 
perfect. "53 "The warranty of merchantability simply directs the 
seller to do what he typically does, and it informs the buyer 
that he should only expect to receive goods of the quality he 
typically gets. "54 
When Philips placed the February, 1980 order, shellbonding 
was the customary production process; T -banding was a non-
customary, particular use. Therefore, Lancaster provided mer-
chantable bulbs under the contract because it supplied the same 
49. 835 F.2d at 661. The hornbook authors state that attempting to define 
merchantability gives both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers ulcers. WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 411. The Code section gives the Lawyer and the courts 
some assistance in defining merchantability by providing: "Goods to be merchantable 
must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container 
or label if any." U.C.C. § 2-314(2). 
50. Id. 
51. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 2. 
52. 835 F.2d at 661 (citing SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, SALES LAW AND THE CON-
TRACTING PROCESS 3-5 (1982». 
53. Id. (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 356 (2d ed. 1980». 
54. 835 F.2d at 661. 
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kind of bulbs which it had typically provided, and Philips had 
no right to expect more than the type of bulbs it had typically 
received. "If Philips wanted something different than that 
which it typically received, it was incumbent on Philips to 
indicate its changed demands, thereby shifting the risk of 
unsuitability for T-banding to Lancaster."s5 Accordingly, the 
Sixth Circuit held that Lancaster did not breach any warranty 
and affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Lan-
caster. 56 
Once a buyer discovers a non-conformity or breach of war-
ranty it is incumbent upon the buyer to notify the seller of 
the complaint. Here, Philips failed to act, leaving the court 
to conclude that the subsequent claims for unmerchantable 
goods resulted only because of an increase in price and a 
disappearing market. Buyers are advised to act quickly in 
notifying the seller of a breach with respect to the quality of 
goods. To do otherwise chances a result like that of the instant 
case or a possible summary judgment and bar from any remedy 
under Section 2- 607(3)(a).57 
III. MATERIAL BREACH 
In the third case involving a construction contract, only 
seven of nineteen payments made to the contractor were made 
on time in accordance with the contract requirements. One of 
the questions presented is whether these delays in payment 
constitute a material breach of the contract thereby excusing 
the contractor from continued performance. 
In In re American Casualty Co., 58 plaintiff, American Ca-
sualty Co. (American), appealed from a judgment holding it 
liable as the surety on a performance bond for two construction 
contracts between the City of Detroit (City) and Brady Me-
chanical, Inc. (Brady). American appealed the district court's 
judgment of liability. In a consolidated case the City, defendant 
and third party plaintiff, appealed the district court's denial 
of its claim for attorney fees and additional costs. 
55. Id. at 662. 
56. Id. 
57. See supra note 43, discussing V.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). 
58. 851 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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In May of 1982, two contracts for development and refur-
bishment of a Detroit housing project were awarded to Brady. 
The housing project consisted of several buildings which were 
heated by a centralized steam plant. The steam was distributed 
from the plant through ten-inch pressure steam lines to various 
substations located throughout the project, where the pressure 
was reduced and the steam subsequently distributed to the 
various buildings. The contract required Brady to replace the 
main high pressure line and certain low pressure lines which 
were old or in serious disrepair, and to reroute low pressure 
lines away from the buildings which were scheduled to be 
demolished. S9 
Brady commenced work in the spring of 1982 and began to 
experience problems. Brady required certain periods of time 
to shut down the lines and cut off the steam heat source. As 
Brady understood the situation, the steam was to be shut down 
during the entire summer of 1982. The City, however, un-
derstood that the steam would be shut down only for limited 
periods throughout the summer, and certainly not during the 
winter because the steam lines provided both heat and hot 
water for the housing project. 60 
Brady attempted to construct a temporary steam line to be 
used while the primary line was shut down. The temporary 
steam line proved ineffective and the parties disputed respon-
sibility for the cost of the ineffective temporary line. Brady 
argued that it was prevented from constructing adequate tem-
porary lines because of problems with the existing structures. 
The City countered that Brady had used an inadequate design 
for the temporary system.61 
Problems with shutdowns were not the only source of dispute 
between the parties. Disagreements also arose with respect to 
payment of invoices sent by Brady. During the early stages 
of the project the City's construction manager instructed Bra-
dy's representatives to add the cost for extra work to various 
line items on Brady's application for payment. Once the City 
realized this it put a stop to the practice, calling upon Brady 
59. Id. at 796. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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to comply with the contract provisions which required change 
orders to be written. 
The City further undertook a review of Brady's applications 
for payment which included charges for the extra work. This 
review resulted in delayed payments to Brady. 62 Additionally, 
there were other delays in payments. Of the nineteen payments 
made during the construction period, seven were made on time, 
six were made two months after the City's receipt of Brady's 
application for payment, and the remainder were made three 
months after receipt of the application for payment. The con-
tract provided that payments were to be made at approximately 
thirty day intervals.63 Brady alleged that the City's delay of 
payments had a severe effect on its cash-flow so as to threaten 
its economic survival. 
The City retained the firm of Ellis, Naeyaert, Genheimer 
Associates, Inc. (Ellis) as mechanical engineer designer of the 
project. As such, Ellis assisted the City in reviewing the progress 
and quality of Brady's work, as well as reviewing Brady's 
requests for payment. Ellis questioned Brady's method of com-
pacting the backfill of pipe treaches. Random testing revealed 
substantial evidence that the compaction and backfill quality 
requirements were not being met. The City directed Brady to 
correct the alleged defects. Brady denied the charges and stated 
conditions with which it expected the City to comply before 
Brady would, or could, complete the project. The City notified 
Brady that its conditions were unacceptable. Brady subsequently 
ceased operations and abandoned the job site in September of 
1983.64 
American initiated action in the district court seeking a 
declaratory judgment with respect to its liability on the per-
formance bonds for the contracts. The City counterclaimed, 
impleading Brady as a third party defendant and seeking dam-
ages for breach of contract. The district court found that the 
City's delays in making payments to Brady and the limitations 
on the steam-shutdowns were not material breaches and that 
the City had not substantially interfered with Brady's per-
62. Id. at 796-97. 
63. Id. at 797. 
64. Id. 
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formance. 6s The district court thus held that Brady had breached 
its contract through defective work and by abandoning the 
project without justification. The court also held that the City 
was entitled to damages, costs and attorney fees. 66 
On American's motion, the district court set aside the award 
for costs and attorneys' fees and substituted an award of 
statutory costs because the City filed its application for attorney 
fees too late under the applicable rules. The district court ruled 
that the City could not recover costs and attorney fees from 
American under its indemnity agreement. American filed an 
appeal, challenging the court's judgment of liability and as-
sessment of damages. The City also appealed the court's denial 
of costs and attorney fees. 67 
Brady argued on appeal that its abandonment of the contract 
was justifiable because the City had already materially breached 
by failing to pay according to the contract terms. The Sixth 
Circuit noted that the City had indeed breached the contract 
by its delays in making payments for extra work. However, 
since the remainder of the contract payments substantially 
conformed to the contract requirements for payment, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the level of breach was not material. 68 
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to Michigan 
case law which holds that whether there has been a material 
breach of the contract is a question of fact for the trier of 
fact to determine.69 If the breach is material, the aggrieved 
party may cancel the contract and sue for breach. Thus, the 
non-breaching party faced with material breach was excused 
fr:om continued performance under the contract. 
The Restatement Second of Contracts70 changed the termi-
nology used in connection with material breach. Under the 
65. The district court found that while there were payment delays, they were 
the result of the City's inefficient bureaucracy and were not material delays. 
Additionally, the court concluded that Brady had held up the procedures for 
approving its applications for payment. 851 F.2d at 798. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 797-98. 
68. Id. at 799. 
69. Pratt v. Van Rensselaer, 235 Mich. 633, 209 N.W. 807 (1926). This holding 
is consistent with other jurisdictions. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERRll..LO, THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 460 (1987). 
70. Restatement, Second, Contracts § 236. J. CALAMARI & J. PERRll..LO, THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS 459 (1987). 
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Second Restatement, the term "total" is substituted for ma-
terial, and only if there is a "total" breach is the injured 
party justified in cancelling the contract.71 Under the Second 
Restatement the term "material" breach is used to cover a 
breach that justifies the aggrieved party in suspending her 
performance awaiting cure. As the hornbook commentators 
indicate, the problem with this new terminology is that an 
aggrieved party may suspend her performance even though the 
breach is "immaterial."72 Because the new terminology only 
creates confusion, the hornbook authors do not employ it. 73 
The instant case used material breach 74 in the orthodox sense 
of . the term. However, practitioners need to be cognizant of 
the changes in terminology found in the Restatement Second 
provisions. As those provisions are adopted by courts, con-
fusion can be expected in light of the changed meaning of 
"material. " 
Brady and American also asserted that Brady's abandonment 
of the contract was justifiable because the City failed to provide 
steam shutdowns. The Sixth Circuit noted that a conference 
memorandum made before work began put Brady on notice 
that an uninterrupted supply of steam was essential to the 
tenants. 75 Further, steam shutdowns were sometimes granted 
by the City without problems; on other occasions permission 
to shut down the steam was withheld for the protection of 
the tenants. 76 The court recognized that Brady was placed under 
financial pressure because of the City's delays in payments. 
However, this did not relieve Brady from performance nor did 
it justify quitting the job. Brady should have sought the reli~f 
provided for in the contract rather than abandoning the project. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. Although the Calamari and Perrillo text refuses to use the new terminology, 
Farnsworth's treatise on Contracts has adopted the new terminology from the 
Second Restatement. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 611·16 (1982). 
74. There is not a simple test for determining whether a breach is material. 
Factors to be considered include: the extent to which the contract has been per· 
formed, whether the breach is willful rather than one caused by negligence, and 
the degree of hardship placed upon the parties. 
75. 851 F.2d at 799. 
76. [d. at 800. 
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Turning next to the issue of damages, the Sixth Circuit 
expressed its uncertainty as to whether the City had proven 
damages with the required degree of certainty.77 Because Amer-
ican's motion to compel discovery on certain phases of the 
issue of damages was denied by the lower court, American 
could not adequately respond or rebut. The evidence also 
indicated that the award of damages was based upon a "rough 
estimate rather than an expert appraisal. "78 Additionally, the 
damage award failed to account for the fact that Brady was 
financially damaged by the City's delays in payments. The 
issue of damages was, therefore, remanded for consideration 
by the district court. Finally the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court's denial of costs and attorney fees. 79 
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
decision that Brady and its surety, American, were liable for 
failure to perform; the issue of damages was remanded; and 
the denial of attorney fees was affirmed. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 801. 
79. Id. 
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